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A BSTR ACT: Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars
in the f ield of strategic st udies w ith his belief that grand strateg y is
indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identif ies key
themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities
from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray’s statement that “all strategy
is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the importance
of agential context in militar y environments—a point often neglected in
strategic practice.

W

ith a career spanning from 1970 to his death in 2020,
Colin S. Gray was a titan of modern strategic studies. His
contributions to the field touched on most of the myriad dimensions
of strategy and may be all but unsurpassable. He was also greatly respected as a
scholar of grand strategy, though it was never the main subject of his books or
articles. Much of his work frequently referenced grand strategy as a higher form
of strategy, at times equivalent to statecraft.
This article compiles, organizes, and reconstructs Gray’s overall grand strategic
thought over the decades, identifying key themes, continuities, conceptual
relationships, and potential discontinuities. It argues Gray’s conception of
grand strategy emphasizes the agential context of military strategy. War is more
than a simple military contest: it inherently involves nonmilitary forms of
power. Grand strategy as agential context is an essential reminder to military
strategists the polity they represent can employ other methods—economic,
diplomatic, and so forth—to wage war, and it is vital the various agencies wielding
these dissimilar forms of power do not work at cross-purposes.
Gray’s conception of grand strategy contradicts the mainstream interpretation
particularly favored in the United States, in which grand strategy is identified
as the master of policy. This view gained credence following Paul Kennedy’s
well-known remark that grand strategy “was about the evolution and integration
of policies that should operate for decades, or even centuries.” 1 Some scholars
are wary of the expansiveness of this definition. Colin Dueck has carefully
argued “grand strategy is not synonymous with foreign policy in general,”
even though he also suggests “[i]t includes peacetime as well as wartime
1. Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Grand Strategies in War and
Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 4.
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policymaking.” 2 Most scholars, however, have embraced it enthusiastically.
Christopher Layne asserts, “[G]rand strategy is about determining a state’s
vital interest—those important enough to fight over—and its role in the
world.” 3 More recently, Charles Martel has argued, “In effect, strategy tells
us what policies to pursue, whereas foreign policy is about the how to do so.
Missing is the broad question of why the state pursues such policies using
particular strategies, which is the precise function of grand strategy.”4 In
placing grand strategy above policy, authors have essentially turned it into
ideology; particular grand strategies are specific ways of interacting with the
rest of the world for the sake of interacting with the world in that specific
way.5 As a crucial side effect, “[s]cholars—and, too often, policymakers—
sometimes skip this step [of performing grand strategy] on the implicit
assumption that if the plan is good enough, implementation will work
itself out.”6

Basic Views on Grand Strategy
To appreciate Gray’s recurring invocations of grand strategy, one must
begin with his basic views on the concept. His fundamental understanding
of grand strategy has four dimensions: (1) the awareness that, in some ways,
grand strategy is a compromise; (2) his preferred definition and what it
encompasses; (3) the relationship between grand strategy and the general
theory of strategy; and (4) the indispensability of grand strategy. These
underlying perspectives set up all further elaborations.
Although Gray referenced grand strategy in earlier writings, after the end
of the Cold War he came to believe it could serve as a compromise between
two disparate scholarly camps. One camp, strategic studies, emphasized
the continued relevance of military strategy, despite the relative peace of
the 1990s. The other camp, security studies, argued military power was no
longer relevant and the security agenda needed to be broadened to encompass
myriad forms of security.7 Gray recognized grand strategy as a compromise
position for accepting the broadening—but not demilitarization—
2. Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008), 10, 11.
3. Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13.
4. William C. Martel, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign
Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4.
5. Adam Elkus, “Must American Strategy Be Grand?,” Infinity Journal 3, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 24–28.
6. Paul D. Miller, American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 221.
7. Joshua Rovner, “Warring Tribes Studying War and Peace,” War on the Rocks, April 12, 2016, https://
warontherocks.com/2016/04/warring-tribes-studying-war-and-peace/.
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of security. 8 This compromise understanding immediately separated
Gray from scholars following the mainstream, academic, international
relations–inspired approach to the field, which broadly defines grand strategy
as the framework into which foreign policy fits.9
This middle way inspired Gray’s favored definition of grand strategy:
“The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a
security community in support of its policy goals as decided by politics.
The theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of
statecraft itself.” 10 This description is broadly identical to his definition
of strategy: “By strategy I mean the use that is made of force and the threat of
force for the ends of policy.” 11 Though similar, there are key differences.
The first obvious difference is breadth. Grand strategy simply
encompasses many more instruments of power than does strategy. Indeed,
Gray suggests grand strategy is statecraft itself, which seems potentially at
odds with his view of grand strategy as a middle way which provides a role for
the military. Statecraft does not inherently require a military dimension in
conception or specific practice and so seems closer to security studies than
a middle way, which also encompasses military power. On the other hand,
Gray did not specifically clarify whether or not any particular practice of
grand strategy required the use of military power. While his writings never
considered grand strategy without a military dimension, this absence could
be due to the fact that strategy, rather than grand strategy, was almost always
his primary topic. Considering statecraft without a military dimension in
specific contexts was beyond the scope of Gray’s writing but not beyond the
scope of the concept.
The second difference concerns political direction. According to Gray,
strategy was instrumental without any control over the overall purpose, while
grand strategy also encompassed some degree of political direction over that
purpose. The inclusion of direction establishes grand strategy as a level of
analysis distinct from and superior to strategy. It also brings grand strategy
closer to policy, which provides guidance for and direction of strategy.
The third difference between Gray’s conceptions of strategy and grand
strategy is the latter controls all instruments of national power, rather
than military force alone. He rarely enumerated the instruments of grand
8. Colin S. Gray, “Approaching the Study of Strategy,” in International Security and War: Politics and Grand
Strategy in the 21st Century, ed. Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz (New York: Nova Science Publishers,
2011), 17.
9. See Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman
to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 86.
10. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.
11. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
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strategy, however, and was largely content with describing them as the
total power available a polity. He provided a taxonomy of grand strategy
only once, identifying the instruments of statecraft as diplomacy; trade and
investment; economic and financial assistance; propaganda, information, and
education; cultural inf luence; espionage, covert action, and political warfare;
military assistance and arms sales; military power (threat or use of force);
arms control; peacekeeping; and humanitarian assistance.12 Notably, the list
included positive inducements (such as various forms of assistance) as well as
coercion, marking another difference between the coercive logic of strategy
and grand strategy.
Nonetheless, Gray was adamant strategy and grand strategy should
only be understood through the general theory of strategy, although again
this statement may contradict other claims concerning grand strategy’s
equivalence with statecraft. “The general theory of strategy covers
both grand and military strategy.” 13 The sibling relationship between
strategy and grand strategy has three conceptual consequences. First,
“[g]rand-strategic and military-strategic analyses interpenetrate . . . When,
acting grand-strategically, policymakers select the mix of instruments
they will employ, that selection must be inf luenced critically by the
plausibility of the competing promises of net strategic effectiveness.” 14
The interpenetration of strategy and grand strategy is a recurring theme.
The second conceptual consequence is that both grand strategy and
strategy are performative. Neither is simply about choices but also about
how effectively those choices are implemented. “All military strategists,
and most grand strategists, cannot perform their duties unless their
schemes, great and small, are done, ‘in the field,’ by soldiers willing to
be led in that physically and psychologically horrendous circumstance of
the most acute personal peril.” 15 Notwithstanding the reference to specific
military implementation, Gray believed performance was equally crucial
for nonmilitary power.
The third conceptual consequence is, like strategy, grand strategy
suffers from what Gray called the currency conversion problem. “The
trouble is that there is a radical difference in nature, in kind, between
violence and political consequence . . . this dilemma of currency conversion
is central to the difficulty of strategy.” 16 That is, how does a strategist
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 87.
Gray, Strategy Bridge, 19.
Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 86–87.
Gray, Strategy Bridge, 214.
Gray, Strategy Bridge, 136.
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ensure any action leads toward the desired political consequence? Although
it is fair to assert the currency conversion problem probably aff licts
military power more than nonmilitary power, it is still relevant for grand
strategy. Gray’s exploration of the relationship between strategic theory
and grand strategy cements the differences between his understanding
and that of the American mainstream, which typically ignores issues of
performance and currency conversion.
The final foundational perspective Gray held about grand strategy
was its indispensability, ref lected in the natures of war, the enemy, and
security. Gray asserted, “The necessity for some approximation to a grand
strategy is revealed in literally every conf lict conducted by all societies. In
times of troubled peace as well as actual war, communities do not compete
with their armed forces alone.” 17 Gray recognized the enemy has input into
the course and outcome of war, but he also understood this vote is grand
strategic: “it does not follow that the terms of engagement can be dictated
by American strategy. A smart enemy may succeed in finding ways
to prosecute conf lict asymmetrically, grand strategically and not only
militarily.” 18 To create and exploit asymmetric advantage in war, the
enemy can also employ nonmilitary instruments.
Gray recognized the security problems any polity might face are
inevitably multidimensional—and even if not, good (grand) strategy
would try to overdetermine the outcome anyway, particularly given the
difficulties of currency conversion. Thus, Gray suggested, “US policy and
grand strategy would be all but certain to have to resort to several tools
(for example, diplomacy, economic sanctions or assistance, and possibly
some regular military deployment and maneuvering for political effect).” 19
In contrast to Gray’s belief in the indispensability of grand strategy,
some scholars have proposed alternatives to, or declared the end of,
grand strategy. 20 This divergence stems primarily from basic definitional
differences. Gray considers the employment of nonmilitary instruments
generically mandatory, a sentiment not shared by all scholars or practitioners
toward foreign policy frameworks.
In summary, Gray believed grand strategy: (1) obeys the dicta of the
general theory of strategy even though it is closer to policy than strategy
17. Gray, “Approaching Study of Strategy,” 17.
18. Colin S. Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 37.
19. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 211.
20. See for example, Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, “The End of Grand Strategy:
America Must Think Small,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 3 (May/June 2020): 107–17; and Peter Layton, “Grand
Strategy? What Does That Do for Me?,” Strategist (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 23, 2012,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/grand-strategy-what-does-that-do-for-me/.
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itself; (2) potentially employs inducements alongside coercion; and
(3) is indispensable. Although there are a few points of potential
inconsistency or vagueness, Gray’s appreciation of grand strategy is
intertwined with his understanding of strategy and war. His writings also
reveal other interesting and important conceptual relationships between
grand strategy and (1) geopolitics and strategic culture; (2) power; (3) war;
and (4) policy. These elements all culminate in a final relationship between
grand strategy and context.

Grand Strategy, Geopolitics, and Culture
Coincident with the first decade of Gray’s career, three big ideas
emerged—or reemerged—within strategic studies: geopolitics, strategic
culture, and grand strategy. 21 Gray’s writings demonstrate close links
between these three concepts, such that it is perhaps impossible to
address one fully without mentioning the other two. This connection is
perhaps most vividly demonstrated in Gray’s 1991 article on geography
and grand strategy, the first substantive section of which focuses on
strategic culture. 22
Gray believed geopolitics and grand strategy are essentially
synonymous, a view he enunciated early in his career. In the introduction
to The Geopolitics of Superpower, he wryly noted, “Had the long-hallowed
British verbal formula of ‘grand strategy’ not been expropriated to such a
persuasive effect by Edward Luttwak, this book might have been called
The Grand Strategy of the United States.” 23 The essential equivalence
between grand strategy and geopolitics is unsurprising given, first, Gray
also equated grand strategy with statecraft and, second, geography is
inescapable: “[a]ll politics is geopolitics,” “[a]ll strategy is geostrategy.” 24
While it does beg the question why he would use two different terms if
they were essentially synonymous, no definitive answer appears in his
published writings.
Geography was also crucial to Gray’s appreciation of strategic culture:
“The first-order subjects of interest to pursuit of the cultural perspective
on strategy have to be geography and history,” and further, “[t]he physical
geographies of particular security communities, including their spatial
relations in all senses with other communities, always have had a large
21. Lukas Milevski, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press),
109–10.
22. Colin S. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 10, no. 4 (1991): 311–29.
23. Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 1.
24. Colin S. Gray, “Inescapable Geography,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2–3 (1999): 163.
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inf luence on strategic choice.” 25 Geography shapes preferences; preferences
turn into choice; choices turn into history; and history in turn shapes new
grand strategic preferences. Gray may have been inspired by well-known
British warfare concepts, including a grand strategic–level cultural notion
encompassing not just how to use—and not use—land power and sea power,
but also financial power. Like Gray, authors such as Dueck and Alastair
Iain Johnston identify close relationships between grand strategy and
strategic culture. 26
Yet, this connection with strategic culture also betrays a limitation
of Gray’s grand strategic thought. Gray understood the importance of
tactical performance for strategic success and extended this principle
to grand strategy as well. However, he rarely discussed grand strategic
performance except when military activity contributes to it. Instead, whether
encompassing the cultural dimension of grand strategy explicitly or not, he
focused on the choice of instruments rather than their performance. This
decision indicates the sheer difficulty of studying grand strategy as a middle
way. It requires familiarity, if not mastery, of items in Gray’s taxonomy
of grand strategic instruments—a list which includes wildly varied forms of
power—and how they work. Total mastery requires not only a staggering
array of various expertise, but also the grand strategic imagination to
combine them effectively in thought or practice. The difficulty of this
task—challenging for both Gray and the entire field—is the foremost factor
inhibiting the development of the study of grand strategy.

Grand Strategy and Forms of Power
Although Gray rarely delved into the performativity of nonmilitary
power, he remained aware vital differences existed among the plethora of
instruments and orchestrating them simultaneously within a single conf lict
was a grave challenge.
To solve the question of how to coordinate various forms of power within
a single grand strategic effort, Gray relied on two main starting points. The
first was the role of geography. “The four geophysical environments for
conf lict—land, sea, air, and space—are distinctive as to technologies, tactics
(and hence doctrines, i.e., how to fight), and operational art.” 27 By placing
physical demands and requirements on humans and their technologies,
geography defines how power actually performs in conf lict. It is possible
25. Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 89, 90.
26. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; and Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand
Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
27. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy,” 316.
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to speak broadly of military power only to a certain point. Eventually,
geographic specificities dominate and distinguish land power from sea
power, air power, space power, cyber power, and nuclear power. However,
there is still merit in studying military power writ large, as it remains
collectively unique compared to nonmilitary power. 28
Nonetheless, military power does lead to an orchestration problem. It
is not merely a question of how a strategist coordinates various forms of
military power—that is, joint warfare—but of interchangeability: how to
employ military and nonmilitary forms of power. “Instead of the threat or
use of force, the grand strategist may be tempted to wage political,
psychological, subversive, diplomatic, economic, or cultural war. Of
course, the military instrument is wielded to psychological and political
effect, and subversive war naturally must have psychological and
political purposes. Strategic effect is generic.” 29 Although all forms of
power are unique—military forms more so than nonmilitary—their
consequences, in principle, should all be reducible to a unified framework.
While Gray did not truly develop such a unified framework, he did
propose some broad insights. With military issues, he suggested its
uniqueness demanded primacy among instrumental grand strategic
considerations. “Although all of the instruments of policy are important,
when the issue of the day is one of military security, questions of military
strategy will assume preeminent importance. The other tools of statecraft—
diplomacy, propaganda, economic pressure, subversion, and so forth—must
be regarded as supporting elements in a context that privileges military
behavior.” 30 Prescribing nonmilitary instruments a supporting role does not
deny their importance in the conduct of war, however, as they may ease or
unnecessarily exacerbate military strategic tasks.
Gray recognized the primacy of consideration military power enjoys is
limited to outright military conf lict. Polities may conduct conf licts with
and through any of the instruments at their command, and in particular
cases military power may be temporarily excluded. “Just as there are wars
wherein, for example, the maritime or the air element is dominant, so
there are conf licts wherein economic, political, or subversive instruments of
grand strategy are accorded the status of leading edge.” 31

28. Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2007), 66.
29. Gray, Modern Strategy, 162. Emphasis added.
30. Gray, Fighting Talk, 72.
31. Gray, Modern Strategy, 163.
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While Gray’s engagement with most nonmilitary forms of power ultimately
ended with these observations, he discussed soft power in more detail.
Joseph S. Nye Jr. originated the concept, defining it as “the ability to get what
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from
the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”32 While
the original definition has been corrupted over time and the term is now
essentially synonymous with nonmilitary power, Gray engaged with Nye’s
original conception of soft power. Because soft power is uncontrollable, with
a nature that is inherently attractive, rather than coercive or inducing, Gray
questioned whether it could be considered a grand strategic instrument.33
Despite its substantial theoretical and occasional real-world value, it is a form
of power which exists beyond the scope of grand strategy, and perhaps policy
as well. At times, soft power merely happens coincidentally, as an added benefit
to the greater actions of a politician or grand strategist. In the context of the
fungibility of power, it may sometimes achieve sufficient effect to replace partially
or fully the need for some other instrument of power. But no sensible strategist
would ever rely on its chance of occurring.
Gray’s final insight concerning the interchangeability of power is that the
limits of fungibility are manipulatable, and can sometimes be pushed further
than expected:
The substitutes need not even be close in character. Competent strategy
will find alternative means and methods, different people to command,
and uses for machines that their inventors and initial military operators had
not intended, in order to adapt in near real time to the challenge of necessity.
This is not to claim that all military, or grand strategic, assets are fully
fungible; of course, they are not. But the strategist needs to be a creative person,
selected in part for his ability to conceive of different routes to an objective.34

Ultimately, however, Gray left these questions for his successors to
develop: how to comprehend generic strategic effect in a way that encompasses all
forms of power (except soft power), within the full performative dimension.

Grand Strategy, War, and Complexity
Just as warfare occurs in war, with war the superior concept, so too
does (military) strategy occur as part of grand strategy. As Gray points
out, “War is a total relationship—political, legal, social, and military. Warfare
32. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x.
33. Colin S. Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st
Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 30.
34. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 155.
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is the conduct of war, generally by military means. A narrow focus upon
warfare proper, which is natural enough for armed forces, can obscure the need
to function grand strategically, in doing which military behavior is only one
dimension of the effort, albeit a vital one.”35 The grand strategic perspective
therefore takes a certain priority, notwithstanding that in war the military
contest is inevitably the most important. Gray suggests this priority is not
necessarily one of significance but of analytical progression. Analysis of a
security challenge begins with grand strategy and incorporates (military)
strategy only once it is politically determined force will be employed.36
The military instrument cannot simply be unleashed on its own, without
first understanding the adversarial challenge and its context. To do so would,
at best, be an inefficient use of a polity’s resources. At worst, it could lead to
defeat or catastrophe.37 Gray’s discussions of grand strategic failures
frequently looked to twentieth-century Germany and the twenty-first-century
United States as examples.
The complexity of grand strategy and war is also reflected in the number
of agents responsible for conceiving and coordinating any grand strategy. This
challenge overshadows the task of coordinating combined arms and joint
warfare because the armed services are closer in perspective to one another
than to nonmilitary perspectives. Moreover, as Gray observes, the coordination
is constant, as the continuous adversarial interaction of war always creates
new challengess:
For a state to function well enough grand strategically, most of its
interconnected parts need to do at least a minimum of what they have to
do at a tolerable level of competence as contributors to a single war effort—
when the grand strategy key is turned. Moreover, someone, actually
several people, processes, and enforcers, are required if a war effort is to be
maintained in the face of surprises.38

Finally, Gray understood grand strategy often posed a danger to itself
due to its sheer complexity, which could obscure crucial elements of military
power and attendant strategy.39 Gray repeatedly emphasized the importance of
tracking the essential elements of war, even while maintaining awareness of,
and being prepared to act within, the full complexity of grand strategy and war:
35. Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 11.
36. Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or
Traditional (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 34.
37. Gray, Fighting Talk, 84.
38. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 129.
39. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, 157–58.
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If one embraces grand strategy as well as its subordinate military
strategy, the sheer complexity and diversity of agents, agencies, processes,
and happenings, all influenced by enemies, friends, and neutrals, is
apt to amount more to chaos than to order in any sense. Strategic theory
acknowledges complexity, diversity, contingency, the unwelcome influence
of the enemy’s efforts, and so forth. But also it must insist upon the
primary existential significance of an actual story arc to the course of
strategic history.40

Grand Strategy and Policy
The variety of actors involved in grand strategic management—
required both to master the full complexity of war and to direct the multiple
instruments of grand strategy—led Gray to question how to differentiate
policy and grand strategy. He realized his interpretation of grand strategy pushed
it into a rarified conceptual atmosphere, making it at times closer to policy
than to its foundational logic in strategy itself. Hence, he admitted in Strategy
and Politics, “Statesmen and strategists, who might be regarded as behaving
in a common category of responsibility, aspire to nudge their polity’s political
and strategic situation along a path of adequate security. This text is closer in
the spirit and focus to being a study of grand strategy than of strategy
approached narrowly in a strictly military mode.”41
Gray struggled between diverging reality and theory. He admitted
“[g]rand strategy undoubtedly is so close to policy that the two can seem
indistinguishable. There is merit in Clausewitz’s rather more limited,
highly apposite claim that ‘at the highest level the art of war turns into
policy.’ ”42 Elsewhere, Gray tested himself more thoroughly against this line of
thought that the highest levels of strategy become policy:
[E]ven though there is an obvious difference between a policy
goal and a strategy to secure it, the intimacy of the connection
between them is such that one could argue that insistence upon the
distinction does more harm to understanding than it does good. On
balance, and it is only on balance, this discussion maintains that
the distinction between a policy objective and plans and actions
for its intended achievement is valid, necessary, and sustainable
under critical fire. However, we admit that policy and its

40. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 176.
41. Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2016), 8.
42. Gray, Fighting Talk, 84.
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execution should be so closely interwoven and continuously in
dialogue that some apparent fusion of, and confusion between, the
two is always likely. 43

Because Gray’s conclusion acknowledges both the inherent messiness of
warfare in practice while maintaining the necessity of conceptual clarity
in theory, it may prove dissatisfying to some scholars.

Conclusion: Grand Strategy as Agential Context
Gray’s interpretation of grand strategy contains much potential
conceptual depth yet to be explored but which may further develop
grand strategy as an idea. He constantly reaff irmed “grand strategy [was]
an essential level of behaviour in the general theory [of strategy].”44
However, in order to encapsulate the meaning of Gray’s grand strategic
thought within his own thinking, one can rely on another word he used
incessantly: context.
Gray always emphasized the importance of context, which could be
understood as cultural, geographical, political, ethical, and so forth, with
as many potential specif ic contexts as there are dimensions of strategy.
As a context, grand strategy is unique. Unlike every other context or
dimension of strategy, grand strategy can be considered an agential
context. That is, the military agency inherent in strategy is situated
within a broader context of grand strategy def ined by simultaneous and
complementary agencies of nonmilitary power.
Military strategies must be nested in a more inclusive framework,
if only to lighten the burden of support for policy they are required to
bear. A security community cannot design and execute a strictly military
strategy. No matter the character of a conflict, be it a total war for survival
or a contest for limited stakes, even if military activity by far is the most
prominent of official behaviours, there must still be political-diplomatic,
social-cultural, and economic, inter alia, aspects to the war.45

Within a particular perspective on strategy which emphasizes strategic
agency in war against a specific adversary, grand strategy is the master
context. It encompasses all activity instrumentally relevant to defeating the
enemy. Regardless of how deeply Gray, at any particular point in his
career, delved into considerations and discussions of grand strategy,
its contextual pressure on the practice of strategy is the single most
43. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 113.
44. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 28.
45. Gray, Strategy Bridge.
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consistent overarching theme in his grand strategic thought. As a
repetitive drumbeat throughout his writing, this theme was a constant
reminder to his readers that, though military power generally—and rightly—
holds priority in war, it hardly ever produced the desired strategic effects
and ultimate political consequences alone. “No matter how military the
behaviour, and regardless of its geographical focus, all strategy is grand
strategy.”46 Gray’s understanding of grand strategy differs substantially
from mainstream interpretations. While his assertions about the
importance of understanding agential context—particularly the
instrumental agencies surrounding military power—may be regarded as
common sense, they are generally neglected in strategic practice.
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